This study raises the question of why labor-friendly capitalist states collect more taxes from the labor. Confirming empirical facts and providing theoretical discussions of the natures of the capitalist state, this study argues that when a capitalist state seeks to weaken its structural dependence on capital and strengthen the public nature of the state, an important prerequisite is the moderation of capital tax burdens for the expansion of the state's fiscal capacity. This study also argues that the development of the welfare state as the reflection of the public nature of the state can be seen as the product of political exchange between the state and capital, gaining capital's consent and compliance with the expansion of the state's fiscal capacity and accepting in return the moderation of capital tax burden. In this political exchange, the labor has their political motivations to participate in the non-market coordination with capital at the labor market level and at the same time endures their higher burdens of fiscal contributions for financing the welfare state.