This study aimed to analyze what drives legislators to decide on waffling in the Korean National Assembly and to develop the waffling theory of the Korean National Assembly, which is different from the United States. To overcome the limitations of existing domestic studies, this study empirically verifies the hypothesis of the study by establishing a model that comprehensively considers not only the individual characteristics of legislators but also the characteristics of bills. The results of the study are as follows. First, bills with more cosponsors were found to be less likely to do waffling by legislators. Second, legislators who represented the bill were less likely to do strategic waffling than those who are cosponsored. Third, if the standing committees revise the bills, it is highly likely that legislators will do waffling by abstaining in the floor voting. Fourth, unlike the U.S. Congress, waffling in the Korean National Assembly was frequently observed in minority members rather than majority members. These results suggest that legislators' waffling behavior in the Korean National Assembly is different from that of the United States and that the bill's characteristics and the individual characteristics of legislators must be considered in the waffling study. Through this study, we expect follow-up studies on lawmakers' waffling decisions in various democratic and authoritarian countries can be conducted beyond the U.S. Congress.